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*I.E.L.R. 186  Introduction   
It has now almost become trite to say that global warming is one of the most pressing 
problems we are facing. Very few would also now deny that the cause of this greenhouse 
effect and the correlated climate change is man.1 What has not been much noted so far is 
that this extraordinary release of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the earth's atmosphere may 
be due in major part to our patent laws. Indeed, the main goal of patent laws is to 
incentivise industrial and technological development, which in turn creates pollution 
including the release of GHG. The question is therefore whether patent law should play a 
role in the protection of the environment and more specifically in cooling the planet. The 
first sub-question to ask is whether patent justifications accommodate this goal. This is the 
subject of another article.2 It reveals that despite the outwardly neutrality of patent laws, 
the latter in fact already cater to some extent for the protection of the environment through 
art.53.a of the European Patent Convention (EPC)3 and corresponding national provisions. 
The research also shows that current justifications do not prevent taking environmental 
concerns, and more particularly climate change, into account and some seem even 
amenable to it. In this light, it submits that patent justifications and laws should be 
re-thought to include environmental goals.  
The next question is, notwithstanding this conclusion, whether patent law should be 
fulfilling this role in addition to environmental law. And if so, what role--modest or more 
pronounced--it should play in the prevention of pollution and the reduction of GHG in 
particular and how it should be implemented in practice. This article seeks to provide an 
answer to these questions. It will show that whatever the position of positive patent law 
and its philosophical justifications are, in the European Union, patent laws must take 
account of environmental laws, because the European Community Treaty (ECT4 ) forces 
them to.  
This article is split into two parts. Part 1 reviews the general environmental principles, as 
they apply to the issue of climate change, and the specific rules relating to globalwarming 
in order to discoverwhat the impact of environmental laws on patent laws is. Part 2, which 
shall be published in the next issue of International Energy Law Review, analyses how 
patent law can help further reduce GHG emissions in the atmosphere over and above the 
current environmental laws. It reviews the different possible systems that can be put in 
place, determines which one is best, and determines amethod to ascertain the 
eco-friendliness of an invention and who should bear this burden of proof. The article 
concludes that patent laws urgently need to address environmental concerns and more 
particularly the problem of climate change and advocates the adoption of a mixed system. 
The focus is on European and national patent and environmental laws. The specific problem 
addressed is global warming. Many of the conclusions could also apply to environmental 
protection in general although more research would need to be carried out to make such 
general extrapolation.  
1. Environmental protection and reduction of greenhouse gases: the 
exclusive role of environmental law?   
Should patent laws address the global warming issue or are environmental laws sufficient? 
In other words, are the latter already adequately addressing the problem? Doesn't the 
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argument that patent law should be modified to grant specific treatment to eco-friendly 
inventions and more specifically those emitting less GHG lose its teeth in view of the 
existing environmental law framework? In order to answer these questions, one has to 
examine what environmental laws actually provide (s.1.1.). In order to discover what role 
environmental laws play in the reduction of GHG emissions, an examination of the general 
principles of environmental law (subs.1.1.1.) and the more specific rules relating to the 
reduction of GHG emissions is in order (subs.1.1.2.). It will be seen that environmental law 
is a good starting point but that *I.E.L.R. 187  more needs to be done not only through 
environmental laws themselves but also through patent laws because of certain guiding 
principles of environmental law (s.1.2.). The analysis of environmental rules also shows 
that there is virtually no conflict between patent and environmental laws (s.1.3.).  
1.1. Environmental law in a nutshell  
 
1.1.1. General principles   
Before examining the general principles governing EU environmental law, it is necessary to 
clarify what, legally speaking, the notion of environment covers. The definition of 
environment varies, but it mainly includes everything apart from human beings, namely 
land, air, water, fauna, flora and natural eco-systems.5 According to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) interpretation of the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the environment refers to 
“ the surrounding objects, regions, or conditions especially circumstances of life of persons 
or society” .6 Whilst the EC Treaty does not define the environment, one can derive a wide 
definition from arts 174.1 and 175.2. Accordingly, in the European Union, the environment 
includes human beings, natural resources, land use, town and country planning, 
archaeological and natural heritage, waste, water, air, fauna and flora.7 Environmental law 
is perhaps best defined by the concept of sustainable development, which recognises that 
nature and human activities are fundamentally interconnected and interdependent.8 The 
concept of sustainable development is itself part of the European legal order as will be 
examined below.  
The ECT requires protection of the environment. Environmental protection is dealt with at 
two different places in the Treaty, namely in arts 2 and 6 (both within Pt I “ Principles” ) and 
in arts 174, 175 and 176 (in Pt III, Title XIX “ Environment” ). The first four environmental 
principles (namely the prevention principle, the polluter-pays principle, the rectification at 
source principle and the integration principle) were introduced in the Treaty in 1987.9 The 
first four of these are enshrined in art.174 of the ECT, while the last one is laid down in 
art.610 The precautionary principle was added later in the Treaty and entered into force on 
November 1, 1993.11 The notion of sustainable development was added in 1997 in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam which entered into force in 1999 (art.2).12 Articles 174-176 are 
defined so broadly that hardly any area of environmental policy is left outside the 
competence of the European Union.13 These principles and rules are then further 
elaborated in secondary legislation. They apply to environmental policies generally and 
therefore also to the reduction of GHG emissions. Most of these principles are also 
enshrined in international conventions14 and in national laws.15 The Treaty also sets out 
four objectives in arts 174-176; namely preserving, protecting and improving the quality of 
the environment, protecting human health, using natural resources prudently and 
rationally and promoting measures at an international level to deal with regional and 
worldwide environmental problems. There is no hierarchy between them and they 
sometimes conflict.16   
The most important provisions for our purposes are the six principles listed above. They will 
be examined in turn.  
1.1.1.1. The principle of sustainable development  
The concept of sustainable development is stated in both arts 2 and 6 of the ECT. Article 6 
mentions that environmental protection must promote sustainable development. Article 2 
provides that the European Union must promote a “ harmonious, balanced and sustainable 
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development of economic activities”  and also requires “ a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment” . Article 2 applies across all areas. A high 
level of protection entails that measures which only provide for the lowest common 
denominator of environmental protection may no longer be adopted but it allows individual 
Member States to adopt more stringent measures if they wish.17   
Sustainable development is therefore a stated objective of the European Union.18 The 
concept is *I.E.L.R. 188  not further defined in the Treaty and has not yet been 
interpreted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).19 And after 20 years of discussion, 
there is still no international consensus on the precise meaning of sustainable 
development.20 In fact, there arguably are more than 200 definitions for it, the most 
agreed with definition being that of the Brundtland Commission's 1987 Report, “ Our 
Common Future” .21 This is also the meaning the concept has in EU law.22 It defines 
sustainable development as “ development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” . Sustainable 
development is often regarded as pursuing the three goals of social development, 
economic development, and environmental protection and enhancement.23 It has also 
been suggested that sustainable development consists of four elements:  
• “ the need to preserve natural resources for the benefit of future generations (the 
principle of „  intergenerational equity‟ );  
• the aim of exploiting natural resources in a manner which is sustainable or prudent (the 
principle of „  sustainable use‟ );  
• the equitable use of natural resources, implying that, in using resources, states must take 
account of the needs of other states („  the principle of equitable use‟  or „  intragenerational 
equity‟ )  
• the need to ensure that environmental considerations are integrated into the economics 
of development plans and that development needs are taken into account in applying 
environmental objectives (the principle of „  integration‟ )” .24   
The requirement of meeting the needs of future generations can be interpreted in two 
different directions.One view is that the next generation must inherit a stock of 
environmental assets no less than the previous generation. The other view is that the 
principle can be satisfied by leaving a stock of environmental assets but also technological 
assets and know-how. Therefore, some environmental assets can be traded off against 
technology. For instance, if a type of landscape disappears, it is sufficient if technology can 
replace it (i.e. people can experience the landscape for instance by computer).25   
However, the concept of sustainable development is an economic or political rather than 
legal one.26 Therefore, according to some, the application of the ECT's provisions on 
sustainable development are “ more of a guideline to policy action that any meaningful 
legal concept.” 27 Some have noted that if international law can influence the notion in the 
European Union, it would seem to mean that:  
“ … although environmental considerations should not be prioritised over the need for 
economic growth, resources should not be diminished to the extent that the needs of future 
generations cannot be sustained” .28   
1.1.1.2. The precautionary and prevention principles  
The precautionary principle was only introduced in art.174.2 of the ECT in 1993 but was not 
defined. It has been first implicitly and then explicitly defined by the Community courts, 
and it is also defined by the European Commission in its Communication on the 
Precautionary Principle,29 which shall be examined below. What is clear in any case is that 
the EU institutions must base their environmental policy on the precautionary principle. 
Therefore, the principle must be reflected, explicitly or implicitly in the secondary 
legislation adopted as a consequence of this policy.30   
There is no single definition of the precautionary principle but it is accepted that it “ means 
that lack of full scientific evidence should not be used as a reason for postponing measures 
to prevent environmental degradation.” 31 The Community courts have interpreted the 
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principle in a series of cases. The early cases which do so, do it implicitly as they do not cite 
the principle although it would have been appropriate to do so.32 However, the cases shed 
some light on the meaning of the precautionary principle.33 In summary, the cases show 
that the Community institutions can take protective measures without having to wait until 
the reality and seriousness of risks to human health or the environment isproved to exist.34 
In addition, they enjoy a broad discretion in doing so. Thus, the ECJ held that:  
“ … it can only examine whether the Community legislator by adopting a 
precautionarymeasure, made a manifest error or misuse of powers, or manifestly 
exceeded the limits of its discretion” .35   
*I.E.L.R. 189  Thus, “ the principles of article 174.2 can be used as a means of marginally 
testing the validity of EC measures” .36 Finally, in the 2002 Pfizer Animal Health SA v 
Council of the European Union case,37 the Court of First Instance (CFI) explicitly interpreted 
the precautionary principle for the first time along the same lines.38 It confirmed that the 
principle would apply when a risk to human health was not scientifically proven. “ What was 
not made clear in the judgment was the point at which uncertainty would demand a 
precautionary response” .39   
In 2000, the European Commission gave its definition of the principle in its Communication 
on the Precautionary Principle.40 Along with the ECJ, the Commission's view is that even if 
the precautionary principle is only explicitly mentioned in the Treaty in the environmental 
field:  
“ … its scope is far wider and covers those specific circumstances where scientific evidence 
is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and there are indications through preliminary 
objective scientific evaluation that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the 
potentially dangerous effects [not only] on the environment, [but also] human, animal or 
plant health may be inconsistent with the chosen level of protection” .41   
The Communication also gives guidelines on how to apply the precautionary principle and 
in this light, encourages the reversal of the burden of proof.42 It has been argued that in its 
Communication, the European Commission took a minimalist view.43 The protection of the 
environment is notmentionedwhen it discusses the reversal of the burden of proof.44 The 
Communication also does not mention the integration principle.45 In addition, the 
environment Commissioner herself played down the importance of the Communication.46   
The European approach of the precautionary principle is strong rather than weak. A weak 
approach is that of the Rio Declaration which relies on “ sound science”  and cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA). This approach requires serious or irreversible damage These two words do 
not appear in the EU discussion of the precautionary principle, although CBA is often 
referred to in EU risk regulation47 and also in the EU policy on the precautionary principle.48 
A strong approach to the precautionary principle:  
“ … would provide that where there are threats to the environment or health, the proponent 
of an activity must prove its safety, without reference to costs and benefits” .49   
However, this raises difficulties; it is almost impossible to prove there is no risk and this can 
in the end completely stall the further development of technology.50 Therefore, the strong 
approach is not often supported officially.51 Some have however interpreted the principle:  
“ … as far as to support a reversal of the burden of proof in the sense that responsibility is 
placed on those who wish to use a method or substance to prove that it is safe” .52   
In other words, it is the producers' responsibility to prove that “ drugs, pesticides or food 
additives are safe where risk to human health cannot be determinedwith sufficient 
certainty” .53 The European Commission's Communication on the precautionary principle 
also encourages shifting the burden of proof and refers to the easily fulfilled condition of the 
need to identify “ potentially negative effects” .54 Nevertheless, the Commission and CFI 
reject the zero risk approach.55 The bottom line is that whilst a measure cannot be based on 
a “ mere conjecture which has not been scientifically verified” , it can however, be based on 
a risk which:  
*I.E.L.R. 190  “ … although the reality and extent thereof have not been „  fully‟  
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demonstrated by conclusive scientific evidence, appears nevertheless to be adequately 
backed up by the scientific data available at the time” .56   
All this has led some to conclude that “ the potential of the precautionary principle has not 
yet been fully explored by the EC institutions” .57   
Related to the precautionary principle is the prevention principle. The Treaty does not 
define it either58 but it has been in place in the European Union for a long time59 and there 
are many legislative instruments which apply it (for instance Directive 2000/53 on end-of 
life vehicles [2000] OJ L269/34, Directive 96/61 (IPPC Directive) [1996] OJ L257/2660 and 
the regulations on eco-labels).61 Also in his opinion on the Association pour la Protection 
des Animaux Sauvages v Prefet de Maine-et-Loire (“ APAS ” ) case, Van Gerven A.G. 
mentions the principle of prevention.62 The literature is divided on whether there is a 
difference between the prevention and precautionary principles. Some think there is no 
difference so that the principles can be used interchangeably,63 while some think there is.64 
It seems though that there is a difference between the two principles.65 According to some 
commentators, the fact that the precautionary principle was added to the prevention 
principle, rather than replaced it, shows that the two principles are not the same.66 
Accordingly, the prevention principle applies when it is more or less certain that damage to 
the environment will occur and the precautionary principle applies when it is unclear it 
will.67 The distinction between the two is therefore “ the degree of uncertainty surrounding 
the degree of risk” .68 In other words, whether the measure is preventive or precautionary 
depends on the question whether the risk is certain or uncertain. A concrete example of the 
application of the precautionary principle can be seen in the field of climate change as the 
European Union committed to reduce GHG emissions even if the latest scientific evidence 
still lacks.69 It could now even be argued that it is the prevention principle that applies to 
global warming if one agrees that there is a difference between the two principles.70   
1.1.1.3. The polluter must pay principle  
The third principle states that the polluter must pay the cost of environmental clean-up. It 
was included in the ECT (art174.2) in 1987 but existed in Community legislation since 1973. 
Although there is no agreed definition of the principle,71 it means that the price of 
environmental damage should not be borne via taxes on society but by the polluter. The 
problem however is the identification of the polluter: in the case of a car, is it the producer 
of the fuel, the manufacturer of the car or the driver?72 It is also difficult to assess the cost 
of degradation73 and first of all, what is pollution?74 The problem is that in reality most 
pollution sources are difficult to find (e.g. water, forest decline, soil erosion, climate change) 
and therefore public authorities are the only ones that can ensure cleaning.75 So far the 
principle is only found in EU directives regulating waste.76 However, some Member States 
have adopted taxes on energy products and fuel, thereby indirectly promoting the 
development of environmentally friendly technologies.77 An EU tax has never seen the light 
of day because it requires unanimity in the Council (art.175.2 of the ECT). The principle is 
still insufficiently implemented by the European Union and the Member States.78 But the 
European Union is committed to apply it more broadly; certain directives already 
implement the principle and other measures have been recently adopted, such as Directive 
2004/35 [2004] OJ L143/56 on environmental liability which also incorporates the 
principle.79 In relation to global warming, one could *I.E.L.R. 191  say that the emission 
trading scheme80 is a way of making producers of GHG pay.  
1.1.1.4. The principle of the rectification of environmental damage at 
source  
The principle of the rectification of environmental damage at source as a priority seems to 
favour the control of pollution at the point of emission rather than further down the chain.81 
But it has not prevented the European Union from adopting measures that control pollution 
later in the chain anyway.82   
“ The principle allows Community emissions limit values to be preferred over quality 
standards but it does not require that such an approach be taken.” 83   
Some argue that the principle is more “ wishful thinking than reality” .84 The term 
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“ rectified”  is not defined and therefore the European Union institutions have a broad 
discretion in deciding how to apply the principle.  
1.1.1.5. The integration principle  
The integration principle is a general principle of European Union law in comparison with 
the four above principles which are specific principles. This means that the integration 
principle “ guides the Community's policy objectives and activities and the implementation 
of those policies.” 85 It is stated in art.6 of the ECT, which provides that:  
“ … environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in article 3, in 
particular with a view to promoting sustainable development” .  
As some have rightly put it, “ the issue of tackling climate change (…) provides a classic 
example of the need to integrate environmental protection requirements into other 
policies” .86   
The fact that the integration principle is placed at the beginning of the ECT is very 
important and symbolic. Since the Amsterdam Treaty, environmental protection is a 
fundamental purpose of the Community. Economic objectives are no longer prioritised.87 
Environmental protection is now considered as forming part of the common market and 
must be taken into consideration even if it interferes with the achievement of economic 
objectives. Article 6 is the most significant environmental principle as it is the bridge 
between environmental policies and other EU policies.88 It is applicable to all Community 
policies89 and invites90 or imposes91 the continuous “ greening”  of all these policies. 
Therefore, art.6 has an impact not only on secondary legislation but also on primary 
legislation.92 The “ Community policies and activities”  affected by art.6 are those listed in 
art.3 of the ECT, i.e. all activities of the Community under the Treaty.93 Article 3 lists 
among others:  
• the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the functioning 
of the internal market94 ;  
• the strengthening of the competitiveness of Community industry; and  
• the promotion of research and technological development.  
These three policies are the most relevant in respect of intellectual property. 
“ Environmental protection requirements”  mentioned in art.6 include the different 
objectives and principles laid down in arts 2 and 174.1 and 174.2, therefore sustainable 
development and the precautionary, polluter pays and rectification at source principles.95   
“ Indeed it does not make sense to apply the precautionary principle under the 
environmental policy and take action without the last scientific evidence of a substance's 
harmfulness and then take the opposite approach in the context of the internal market 
policy.” 96   
Whilst, according to art.6 of the ECT, the EU institutions must take the environmental 
impact of Community activities into account,97 they also have a *I.E.L.R. 192  wide 
discretion on how to implement the integration principle at the level of specific legislative 
measures.98 However, it is clear that art.6 does not have priority over other interests or 
requirements.99 This is because the different objectives of the EC Treaty have equal rank. 
Thus the Community must endeavour to achieve them all.100 The integration principle 
implies that when Community legislation must be interpreted, its interpretation must 
favour a meaning which renders the provision consistent with the integration principle or at 
least be consistent with it, especially when there is a gap in the law or more than one 
interpretation.101 When a conflict between economic and environmental objectives arises, 
the two must be reconciled insofar as possible.102 If this is not possible, then one of the 
conflicting objectives may be given priority temporarily:103   
“ It is doubtful whether, in case of such a conflict, an interpretation of Community law that 
would cause, increase or intensify pollution could be at all in line with the integration 
principle.” 104   
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The ECJ has so far not discussed the issue whether an EU act had to be voided because it 
did not take environmental requirements into consideration but some commentators think 
such acts should.105 For instance, the Fifth Environmental Action programme advocated the 
integration of the environment into key economic sectors (particularly tourism, transport, 
energy, industry and agriculture) and the Sixth Environmental Action Programme intends 
to reduce “ pressures in the environment from various sources” .106 So for instance:  
“ … the Community's transport policy must take due account of potential environmental 
impacts, but the fact that a particular proposal in that field might have negative 
environmental effects could be outweighed by economic and social considerations If this 
proved to be the case, negative environmental impact should be assessed and kept to 
aminimum but environmental harm may well still be inflicted even if due account is taken 
of the integration principle.” 107   
Whilst this is how the integration principle should be applied in theory, the chequered 
history of the principle's application shows that in reality, environmental protection is, still 
now, far from being well integrated in other EUpolicies. It is not the place to retrace the 
history of the principle but suffice it to say that the first EU Environmental Action 
Programme, which dates from 1973, already mentioned that environmental protection 
should be integrated in other EU policies but the Commission did nothing to that effect and 
this remained so even after introduction of the principle in the Treaty in 1987 and with the 
actions the Commission envisaged in 1993 (i.e. mark all proposals with significant 
environmental impacts, and set up an environmental network between the 
Directorates-General) but never actually executed.108 In the end, if progress has been 
made, it has been slow and uneven, mainly due to lack of (political) commitment.109 This 
leads some to conclude that such integration will start to become a reality when the 
Community courts annul a regulation or directive because it did not respect art.6.110 Until 
then, art.6 will remain a nice principle not taken seriously by the institutions.111 In sum, 
more remains to be done to give full effect to the integration principle.  
1.1.1.6. Legal character of the environmental principles  
All this is well and good, but do the environmental principles described above have any 
legal effect? The literature is divided on this crucial question.112 Some deny the principles 
any binding character,113 *I.E.L.R. 193  whilst some argue that they are binding.114 
However, when analysed more closely their positions are not so far apart, as those who 
deny binding character to the principles still concede that they are a leitmotiv and rule of 
interpretation, which imply a certain legal effect.115 Those who argue they have binding 
character still insist that as the principles are vague, the institutions have a broad margin 
of discretion. The majority's view seems to be that the principles are legally binding for 
three main reasons. First, they are included in the Treaty; secondly, their vagueness does 
not mean they have no legal effect and thirdly, the ECJ has recognised that some principles 
have legal force.116   
However, the way principles are drafted differs so their legal force does too.117 Accordingly, 
three different types of principles can be distinguished as proposed by Espiney:  
1) global objectives;  
2) obligations to take account; and  
3) obligations referring to result.118   
In which category do the several environmental principles fall into?  
Global objectives are formulated so vaguely that the institutions' discretion is very wide. 
Therefore, it is almost impossible that the ECJ could hold that these obligations have been 
breached119 and therefore, that the non-respect of a global objective can be used to nullify 
a measure taken by the European Union.120 These global objectives are therefore 
non-binding guidelines. Espiney categorises sustainable development and “ a high level of 
protection”  (both provided for in art.2 of the ECT) as global objectives. However, in the 
Safety Hi-Tech Srl v S&T Srl case, “ the Court seems to admit that every measure should 
contain such a high level” .121 The phrase “ aiming at”  is arguably an obligation for the 
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institutions to take measures “ in a way that the high levelmay be attained or 
approached” .122   
Obligations referring to result are precise and refer to the content of Community 
measures.123 Arguably arts 174.2 and 6 are such obligations. The principles in this category 
are still too imprecise to deduce enforceable obligations to act.124 When legislating however, 
the institutions must respect the principles; therefore they are binding. But since they have 
a wide margin of discretion (albeit less wide than under the general objectives), the 
principles would be breached only if the measures manifestly disrespected the 
principles,125 i.e. when the institutions made a manifest error, misused their powers or 
manifestly exceeded the limits of their discretion.126 So an act could be annulled only 
exceptionally.127 Indeed, the Community courts have agreed to review the validity of 
secondary legislation according to art.174.2 principles, clearly showing that the principles 
are binding.128 The fact that Community legislation can only be annulled when it is blatantly 
disregarded does not change this fact.129 The decisions show that for instance, the 
precautionary *I.E.L.R. 194  principle is enforceable “ in the sense that it can influence the 
outcome of legal disputes before the ECJ” .130 But “ in practice, it will be hard to prove that 
this obligation was not met due to the wide margin of discretion” .131 Nonetheless:  
“ … even if the number of court decisions invoking the polluter-pays, prevention and 
precautionary principles has been small to date, evolution has led some of those principles 
being given an autonomous normative value that makes them directly applicable in 
German, French, Belgian and Dutch law” .132   
It is unlikely however that the principles will ever have direct effect, i.e. that an individual 
can argue that a national measure can be voided because it does not respect one of the 
principles.133 Indeed, the Treaty principles are addressed only to the Community 
institutions.134 Nonetheless, even if secondary legislation does not explicitly refer to but 
nevertheless enshrines the principles, art.10 of the ECT obliges Member States to give 
them effect because it states that Member States must take measures to fulfil their 
obligations arising out of the Treaty or at least refrain from taking any measure which could 
jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.135 Thus, according to some, once 
the precautionary principle (and in our view by extrapolation the other principles as well) is 
included in secondary legislation, individuals can argue that national actions or legislation 
that fall within the scope of EU legislation violating the precautionary principle are void.136   
The Community institutions'--and if the above argument is followed, the Member 
States'--breach could be an action or arguably also an omission.137 For instance, Espiney 
wonders whether the precautionary principle is (sufficiently) taken into account in the IPPC 
Directive.138 Also in the area of road traffic, the integration principle is most likely not 
sufficiently taken into account.139 Even if there is discretion, she thinks that the principles 
establish some sort of minimum standard and:  
“ … this must be taken into account on the level of the obligation to a positive action as well 
as on the level of the manner of shaping secondary legislation” .140  Espiney also thinks that 
the ECJ tends to be too generous in the margin of discretion it leaves to the institutions.141 
In the same vein, Dhondt believes that the integration principle must be interpreted as an:  
“ … obligation to take account of the requirements in such a way that it must have real 
consequences for (existing and proposed) action” .142   
In this interpretation, the margin of discretion is more limited. This may mean that there is 
an obligation to apply the environmental principles “ in the same way as they are applied in 
the context of environmental policy” .143 Some commentators are more categorical and 
believe that:  
“ … any Community legislation that does not integrate environmental protection 
requirements properly, in particular, if a resulting harmful effect on the environment 
cannot be justified by clear and overriding reasons, is therefore subject to annulment by 
the court in accordance with article 230 et seq EC”  (emphasis added).144   
What seems clear under this view is that economic and other interests, when conflicting 
with environmental concerns, will have to be conciliated and balanced.145 Some even argue 
that the balance should tilt in favour *I.E.L.R. 195  of environmental concerns when the 
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three principles of prevention, precaution and polluter-pays clash with other norms.146 In 
conclusion, commentators diverge as to the exact legal force of the principles but there is 
consensus that they must have some legal effect.  
1.1.2. Specific regulation of greenhouse gases emissions   
 
1.1.2.1. International framework  
Before analysing EU law, a brief overview of the international legal framework set up to 
combat climate change and therefore reduce GHG emissions will help put EU law into the 
broader context. There are two major international legal instruments addressing climate 
change, namely theUnitedNationsFramework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and its subsequent Kyoto Protocol.147 A revision of the Kyoto Protocol should take place in 
Copenhagen in 2009.  
The UNFCCC, signed in Rio, dates from 1992 and came into force on March 21, 1994.148 
186 governments were parties to it in 2004. Both the Community and the Member States 
are bound by it.149 The Convention's objective is to stabilise rather than reduce the release 
of GHG.150 More precisely, it is to:  
“ … stabilise gas emissions at a level which would not interferewith the climate systemor 
food protection but would still allow sustainable economic development (art. 2)” .151   
In the Convention, parties commit inter alia to:  
“ … develop and transfer technologies, practices and process to control greenhouse gases 
in all relevant industrial sectors (including energy, transport, agriculture, forestry 
andwaste management) and promote research (…)” .152   
The Kyoto Protocol dates from 1997 and entered into force in 2005.153 It goes further than 
the Convention as it aims to reduce emission of the six main GHG, i.e. carbon dioxide, 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) 
and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). The aim is to arrive at a reduction of 5.2 per cent of 1990 
GHG levels by 2012. Reduction can be done in three ways: joint implementation (countries 
teaming together to reduce GHG levels so that one country can reduce GHG less than the 
other), clean development mechanisms (emissions reduction projects in developing 
countries financed by the industrialised countries) and emissions trading.154 According to 
the Treaty, emissions trading could start only as of 2008,155 but that did not prevent 
countries starting trading emissions earlier. The EU initiated emissions trading on January 
1, 2005.  
1.1.2.2. Community framework  
How is the European Union tackling climate change? What do EU environmental laws 
provide in relation to GHG emissions? The European Union took the initiative to tackle GHG 
emissions early, in the 1970s, and still strongly believes that developed countries “ must 
show the lead in reducing emissions.” 156 Many measures so far taken by the European 
Union directly or indirectly reduce GHG in the atmosphere, and will be examined below. 
Environmental instruments are mostly directives rather than regulations. The most 
prominent recent measure is the European Union's ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on May 
31, 2002, in which it agreed to reduce its levels of emissions by eight per cent in 
comparison to the levels in 1990.157 Prior to ratification, in 2000, the European Union had 
already started implementing the Kyoto Protocol in the European Climate Change 
Programme (ECCP).158 The approach taken by the ECCP is:  
“ … a good example of external integration of environmental considerations into other 
policy areas as it involves initiatives across the energy, transport and industrial 
sectors” .159   
In 2002, the Decision on the Sixth Environment Action Programme mentioned that its aim 
was to limit the global temperature rise at two degrees celsius and acknowledged that in 
order to achieve this goal, a global reduction in emissions of GHG by 70 per cent compared 
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to levels in 1990 was necessary, as identified by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC).160   
Here follows a list of the most relevant environmental measures adopted by the European 
Union in relation to the reduction of GHG emissions. They are *I.E.L.R. 196  classified by 
type of measure (whether directly and indirectly reducing GHG emissions161 ) and 
chronologically, to highlight whether they were adopted before or after the Kyoto Protocol 
(i.e. 1997). The measures most relevant in the context of this article include the EU 
emissions trading scheme (as set out in the ETS Directive), effective implementation of the 
energy efficiency requirements of the IPPC Directive, the promotion of renewable energy 
and biofuels162 and other measures which improve the thermal insulation of buildings, and 
the efficiency of certain equipments, such as electrical ones.What these instruments do will 
therefore be briefly described below.  
Direct measures:  
• Directive 93/76 to limit carbon dioxide emissions by improving energy efficiency (SAVE) 
[1993] OJ L237/28.  
• Directive 95/12 implementing Directive 92/75 with regard to energy labelling of 
household washing machines [1995] OJ L136/1.  
• Directive 96/57 on energy efficiency requirements for household electric refrigerators, 
freezers and combinations thereof [1996] OJ L236/36.  
• Directive 96/60 implementing Directive 92/75 with regard to energy labelling of 
household combined washer-driers [1996] OJ L266/1.  
• Directive 96/61 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive) [1996] OJ L257/26, as amended by 
Directive 2003/87 below.  
• Directive 2001/77 on promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in 
the internal electricity market [2001] OJ L283/33.  
• Directive 2002/91 on the energy performance of buildings [2003] OJ L1/65.  
• Directive 2003/30 on promotion of the use of biofuels or other renewable fuels for 
transport [2003] OJ L123/42.  
• Directive 2003/87 [2003] OJ L275/32 and Directive 2004/101 amending Directive 
2003/87 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community, in respect of Kyoto Protocol's project mechanisms (ETS Directive) [2004] OJ 
L338/1.  
• Directive 2003/96 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy 
products and electricity [2003] OJ L283/51.  
• Decision 2004/280 concerning a mechanism for monitoring Community greenhouse gas 
emissions and for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol [2004] OJ L49/1. Under this 
decision, the European Commission drafts regular reports and evaluates the national 
programmes to limit GHG emissions.163   
• Directive 2006/40 relating to emissions from air-conditioning systems in motor vehicles 
[2006] OJ L161/12.  
• Regulation 2006/842 on certain fluorinated greenhouse gases [2006] OJ L 161/1.  
• There are also several directives setting emissions standards for emissions in the 
atmosphere.164   
Indirect measures:  
• Directive 94/62 on packaging and packaging waste [1994] OJ L365/10.  
• Directive 2000/53 on end-of life vehicles [2000] OJ L269/34. As the Directive obliges 
Member States to encourage the reduction of the amount of materials to manufacture cars, 
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it indirectly reduces the consumption of materials which can produce GHG when cars are 
made in the first place. The Directive “ will for example lead to increased recycling and 
recovery rates for used cars, and the improved treatment of fluids containing greenhouse 
gases.” 165   
• Directive 2002/96 on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE Directive) [2003] 
OJ L37/24, amended by Directive 2003/108 [2003] OJ L345/106.  
Let us now examine the impact of these measures on emissions.  
Directive 96/57 requires that:  
“ Member States shall take all necessary measures to ensure that refrigeration appliances 
covered by this Directive can be placed on the Community market only if the electricity 
consumption of the appliance in question is less than or equal to the maximum allowable 
electricity consumption value for its category as calculated according to the procedures 
defined in Annex I.”   
Directive 96/57 is a first step only as it does not set specific targets to reduce the general 
consumption of such appliances.  
Directive 96/61, also called the IPPC Directive can be said to be the ancestor of the ETS 
Directive. The aim of the IPPC Directive is to reduce emissions in the air, water and land 
caused by certain activities; mainly those of heavy industries such as coke and timber, and 
chemical industries166 (art.1). The IPPC Directive defines “ substance”  as “ any chemical 
element and its compounds, with the exception of radioactive substances within the 
meaning of Directive 80/836/Euratom and genetically modified organisms within the 
meaning of Directive 90/219/EEC and Directive 90/220/EEC”  (art.2.1). “ Pollution”  is 
defined as:  
“ … the direct or indirect introduction as a result of human activity, of substances, 
vibrations, heat or noise into the air, water or land which may be harmful to human health 
or the quality of the environment, result in damage to material property, or impair or 
interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment”  (art.2.2).  
Article 2.5 defines “ emission”  as the release of substances, heat, noise or vibrations in the 
air, water *I.E.L.R. 197  or land. This language is very broad. The substances listed in 
Annex III of the IPPC Directive include GHG and therefore their release constitutes 
pollution.167 According to the IPPC Directive, the listed industries (“ installations” ) have to 
have a permit to emit substances. The Commission sets emission limit values whilst 
Member States set up the relevant authorities which grant permits. Therefore, the 
emissions of the listed substances are reduced.  
Directive 2001/77:  
“ … lays down non-binding „ indicative‟  targets for the proportion of electricity generated 
from renewables, and requires Member States to publish reports on their performance” .168   
The overall EU target is 22 per cent. Article 3 of Directive 2001/77 provides that Member 
States must take “ appropriate steps to encourage greater consumption of electricity 
produced from renewable energy sources” . Article 3 further indicates that if Member 
States' progress is insufficient, binding targets will be set.169 Directive 2001/77 also 
requires Member States to ensure that electricity produced from renewables is actually 
guaranteed to be produced from renewables (art.5). Renewable energies are energies 
from sources which occur naturally and repeatedly in the environment; these include wind, 
waves, sun, biomass, tides, landfill gas and sewage treatment plant gas.170   
In light of the fact that buildings account for more than 40 per cent of final energy 
consumption in the European Union (recital 6), Directive 2002/91171 requires Member 
States to set minimum requirements for the energy performance and certification of 
energy efficiency for all new buildings and large old buildings undergoing major renovation 
(arts 4-7).172 Directive 2002/91 also requires Member States to take measures so that 
boilers and air-conditioning systems are regularly checked by independent experts173 in 
order to limit energy consumption and specifically CO2 emissions (arts 8-10).  
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The aim of Directive 2003/30 is that by 2011, biofuels constitute 5.75 per cent of the 
transport fuel market.174 Directive 2003/30 reiterates that “ the transport sector accounts 
for more than 30 per cent of final energy consumption in the Community”  and that this is 
bound to increase.175 Themain responsibility for the increase of CO2 is road transport (84 
per cent).176 Directive 2003/30 requires Member States to “ ensure that a minimum 
proportion of biofuels and other renewable fuels is placed on their markets”  and to that 
effect, they have to set national indicative targets (art.3).  
Directive 2003/87 or ETS Directive amends the IPPC Directive, which already dealt with, 
among others, GHG emissions permits. The ETS Directive makes the EU emissions trading 
systemtake the Kyoto Protocol's targets into account.177 In short, the ETS Directive obliges 
a number of industries (mineral oil refineries, coke ovens, themetal,mineral (this includes 
steel, glass and cement manufacture) and paper industries) to have a permit which states 
the maximum amount of greenhouse gases they can emit (art.4).178 These industries “ will 
account for approximately 46 per cent of the estimated EU carbon dioxide emissions in 
2010” .179 The ETS Directive initially only deals with CO2 emissions from “ installations”  
(i.e. stationary technical units) (art.3). However, the Commission proposed that the ETS 
could be extended to other sectors and other GHG at a later date, the intention being that 
all GHG will eventually be tradable.180 The scheme started on January 1, 2005 and works as 
follows. If an installation finds it difficult to comply with the cap set in its permit, it can 
purchase “ allowances”  (permit to emit CO2) from another installation which finds it easier 
to do so and therefore has not met its cap and has spare allowances to trade. If the 
installation emits more CO2 than permitted, it will have to pay a penalty per tonne (this 
penalty started to apply in 2008). Member States are given quite some flexibility to allocate 
allowances. They must designate a competent authority which will deliver the permits 
(art.18) and the authority must be satisfied when it delivers them that the operators are 
capable of monitoring and reporting the said emissions (art.6.1). Member *I.E.L.R. 198  
States must also establish a registry to write down the holding, transfer and cancellation of 
allowances. Any person may hold allowances (art.19). The ETS Directive does not prevent 
national trading schemes (recital 16) and will be amended in light of future developments 
at international level (i.e. if future international conventions require the further reduction 
of GHG emissions) (recital 22). In this respect, the European Union recognises that in the 
long term emissions will have to be reduced by around 70 per cent compared to 1990 levels 
to properly tackle global warming (recital 2). The EU emissions trading scheme therefore 
encourages the development of cleaner technologies.181   
Directive 2003/96 introduces minimum tax rates on all energy products. These include coal, 
gas, electricity, motor and heating fuels. “ Member States are allowed to introduce reduced 
tax rates for biofuels and electricity produced from alternative energies.” 182   
Regulation 2006/842 aims to reduce to a minimum the use of certain GHG, namely SF6, 
HFCs and PFCs. According to art.3, operators of the stationary applications (i.e. 
refrigeration, air conditioning, heat pump equipment and fire protection systems) which 
contain fluorinated gases shall use all measures which are technically feasible and do not 
entail disproportionate costs to prevent and repair leakage. Article 4 requires that gases be 
recycled, reclaimed or destroyed.  
Finally, Directive 2006/40 provides for the limitation of fluorinated gases in the 
air-conditioning system of cars, by limiting the type-approval of cars that contain gases 
with too high a global warming potential. Directive 2006/40 has now entered into effect 
(art.5) as a Regulation has been taken to adopt a harmonised leakage detection test.183   
1.1.2.3 Conclusion  
It can nowbe seen that EUenvironmental rules already play an important and increasing 
role in the reduction of GHG emissions. On the one hand, the several Treaty principles lay 
down a firm basis on which the European Union must base its environmental policy. 
Sustainable development is also now part of the general objectives of all EU policies. Most 
importantly, the integration principle imposes that the treaty principles be respected in any 
EU policy having an impact on the environment. The vagueness of the principle waters 
down its legal force but the Community courts could definitely be more aggressive in the 
future in ensuring secondary legislation respects it, by reducing the institutions' margin of 
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discretion.  
Specific secondary legislation impose the reduction of GHG emissions by most industries 
(including those producing electricity), by road traffic (through the promotion of biofuels) 
and by new buildings and establish a market for trading emissions, which works as an 
incentive to reduce GHG emissions as well. All these initiatives show not only a 
commitment from the European Union to reduce GHG emissions but also constitute a 
sweeping arsenal of measures effectively forcingMember States to reduce their carbon 
footprint. This European swift (themost significant directives for the reduction of GHG 
emissions were taken within a period of three years, between 2001 and 2003) and 
wide-ranging effort can only be applauded. The Council's goal in 1999 to significantly raise 
the profile of energy efficiency184 is certainly close to being achieved. However, these 
measures do not go far enough to properly fight global warming. Environmental law's role 
remains in some way limited in this respect.  
First of all, the legislation so far only imposes small emission reductions. The targets set by 
the directives are generally indicative or non-existent or existing but still too low in view of 
the much higher targets that need to be achieved to have a significant effect. For instance, 
the Directive on promotion of electricity generated by renewable energies has only an 
overall 22 per cent target and national targets are indicative.185 Similarly, the Directive 
promoting biofuels sets only a small and indicative target. Secondly, not all industries are 
covered (only heavy ones although neither chemical nor waste industries are covered) 
whilst there are no measures at all concerning emissions from air, sea and rail transport.186 
The obligation that most products and appliances consuming energy (such as electrical 
household appliances) emit less GHG is limited if non-existent. It is true however that if in 
the end, most energy is produced by renewables, it is not a problem. Emissions from 
farming are also not covered. In addition,most old buildings do not have to comply with 
Directive 2002/91. Thirdly, there is still no European tax onGHGemissions187 
(althoughDirective 2003/96 deals with the taxation of energy products and electricity). 
Whilst the ETS Directive indirectly encourages the invention of cleaner technologies, it is 
not sufficient because, although its goal is to reduce GHG emissions, emission trading does 
not in itself reduce such emissions188 (some industries can still pollute if they pay for it) and 
there is no real European control on the allowances,which are set independently by 
Member States and can therefore be more or less generous. Shell and other proponents of 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) have recently voiced that:  
*I.E.L.R. 199  “ … the structure of the EU Emission Trading Scheme provide[sic] 
insufficient incentive for companies to build the multibillion solar plants that promise to 
convert dirty coal-fired polluters into low-emission generators.” 189   
These initiatives are excellent first steps but are still not sufficient to fully and properly 
tackle global warming at EU level, let alone at international level. This is because not all 
industrial, agricultural and individual processes and products are required to emit less GHG. 
Therefore, the patent system has certainly a role to play to incentivise the invention of 
green technologies. But before determining the extent of this role, it is necessary to check 
the exact impact of environmental laws on patenting.  
1.2. Implications of environmental law for patent law  
We now have an overall picture of the general and specific environmental rules adopted by 
the European Union to reduceGHGemissions. What is the impact on European and national 
patent laws? This section first envisages the implications of the general principles and then 
of the specific rules regulating GHG emissions.  
1.2.1. Implications of the general principles   
Whilst art.2 of the ECT is probably too vague to be as such enforceable, arts 6 and 174.2 of 
the ECT in any case force the European Union and its Member States to develop in a more 
sustainable way and make sure that economic development does not harm the 
environment. This is because by definition the concept of sustainable development includes 
the integration principle. How can a country attain sustainable development if it does not 
integrate environmental protection within its economic rules?190 The majority would agree 
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that the combination of arts 6 and 174.2 means that patent laws (and for that matter, other 
intellectual property laws if necessary) must be revamped to take environmental concerns 
into account. As seen above, art.6 states that:  
“ … environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in article 3 in particular 
with a view to promoting sustainable development” . Article 3 lists (h) approximation of the 
laws of Member States to the extent requirement for the functioning of the internal market, 
(m) strengthening of competitiveness of Community industry and (n) promotion of 
research and technological development, policies and activities which touch upon 
intellectual property laws.  
Consequently, if an invention emits above a certain legal threshold of GHG, it would 
arguably breach both arts 6 and 174.2. This would be because of the patent laws' lack to 
integrate the principles contained in art.174.2. Such a patented invention would not 
respect the prevention (rather than precautionary),191 polluter-pays and rectification at 
source principles. At present, there is no measure whatsoever in the EPC, the proposed 
Community Patent or national patent laws which try and integrate even a little any of the 
principles laid down in art.174.2, for instance by giving special treatment to “ green”  
inventions or penalising non-green ones.192 Therefore, the ECJ could possibly rule that such 
omission is a breach of the Treaty.193 The precautionary principle is already an integral part 
of EU medical (pharmaceutical) law and EU (GM) food safety law.194 There is no reason why 
it could not become part of patent law in view of the dangers some technologies can pose, 
including pollution and GHG emissions.  
The European Patent Office (EPO) has not fared better. As well explained by Pavoni in 
relation to biotechnological inventions:  
“ … in practice, in its decisions rejecting claims based on environmental risks of 
biotechnological inventions, the European Patent Office (…) has never undertaken the 
slightest effort to consider and evaluate principles and legal instruments of international 
environmental law. (…) On the other hand, the precautionary principle certainly represents 
the legal rule more appropriately connected with the lawfulness of commercial transactions 
over biotechnology products. The state of widespread disagreement about the 
environmental adverse impact of these products would in fact appear to be apt for a 
solution consistent with the principle's call for measures to minimise or avoid such 
scientifically uncertain risks.Unfortunately the EPO has disregarded the principle in a way 
*I.E.L.R. 200  similar to what has been done by WTO bodies. More importantly, it has 
endorsed conceptions which are completely at variance evenwith the timid recognition of 
the principle which has occurred atWTO level.” 195   
Unfortunately, the ECJ does not have jurisdiction over the EPO. Nevertheless, if the EPO 
goes against international conventions or even EU legislation with which its members have 
to comply, it will be forced to change its views.  
Even if the Community institutions do not act to integrate environmental law in other 
policies and the ECJ does not have the opportunity to rule on the matter, it does not 
prevent Member States from acting to do so. In a case predating the introduction of the 
integration principle,196 the Advocate General considered that a national tax on aircraft fuel 
was compatible with the Directive on mineral oil taxes “ if it provided demonstrable 
incentives for the use of environmentally friendly aircraft and therefore had an 
environmental orientation effect” .197 Thus, according to some:  
“ … if national protective measures have a useful effect on the Community environment and 
help to identify best practices, this fact should be taken into account” .198   
This is becauseMember States can adopt a higher level of environmental protection. So:  
“ … article 6 [ECT], together with article 5.2 and 5.3, can provide for preference for an 
interpretation of Community law that opens a certain scope for national action, on the 
condition that: (i) the wording of Community law is open to such an interpretation, (ii) 
national measures can have a useful effect on the Community environment and (iii) other 
Community objectives are not severely affected” .199   
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Therefore, Member States are free to change their patent laws to integrate environmental 
protection, in the absence of European Union or EPO initiative.  
1.2.2. Implications of the specific rules   
What about the implications of the specific measures regulating GHG emissions on 
patenting? Inventors will often have an incentive to “ invent green”  because of the 
European (and also of course national) environmental rules. More specifically, when an 
industry or producer has to comply with secondary legislation regulating GHG emissions, it 
will often have an incentive to use new processes or products that reduce its emissions. 
Thus, environmental rules have an indirect effect on the incentive to patent 
environmentally-friendly inventions. However, as stated earlier, environmental rules are 
still incomplete so whilst specific environmental rules regulating GHG emissions will 
indirectly generate more green inventions, patent law still has a role, namely to fill the gaps 
of current environmental legislation, as also mandated by art.6 of the ECT. For instance, 
Directive 2003/96 will encourage producers of energy to produce it from renewable 
sources as these are not taxed in comparison to those emitting GHG (coal, gas, motor and 
heating fuels). Therefore, it will entice them to invent technologies to produce this energy 
that do not involve sources of GHG as they will otherwise be taxed. However, it will not 
force producers to produce energy from renewables and thus, if need be, invent new 
technologies to do so. On the other hand, Directive 2002/91 will force builders to use 
materials not emitting GHG. Therefore, it will encourage the invention of technologies 
permitting this. Likewise, Directive 2001/77 and Directive 2003/30 will encourage the 
invention of technologies allowing electricity and fuel to be produced from 
renewables.Recital 15 of Directive 2003/30 itself states that promoting use of biofuels 
whilst at the same respecting sustainable development could “ open a new market for 
innovative agricultural products with regard to present and future Member States”  
(emphasis added). Recital 24 also says that “ research and technological development in 
the field of sustainability of biofuels should be promoted”  (emphasis added).One could see 
there an implicit encouragement to integrate environmental policy into patent law. 
Stretching it, it could arguably mean that a special regime should be established for such 
patentable inventions. Directive 2003/30 also seems to implicitly apply the precautionary 
principle as it requires that the Commission monitors the impact of biofuels on sustainable 
development and on CO2 emissions.200 Finally, in the same vein, the emissions trading 
scheme should push the heavy industries to patent new technologies which allow them to 
reduce their GHG emissions, as one of Directive 2003/30's recitals also hints.201 However, 
as seen above, the current ETS scheme does not seem to be enough of an incentive 
according to some companies.202 Like the Directive on the promotion of biofuels, it is 
interesting *I.E.L.R. 201  to note that the ETS Directive seems to apply the integration 
principle but here a bit more explicitly.203   
This analysis confirms our conclusions in s.1.1.2.3. of this article that patent laws have a 
role to play in the reduction ofGHGemissions.Howcan both companies and individuals go 
further, beyond compliance with the current environmental rules to tackle global warming, 
and reduce their carbon footprint? In short, by producing less and/or by using less polluting 
materials and energies. This is where patent laws come into play. Inventors can reduce 
everyone's carbon footprint by inventing and patenting new technologies, be they more 
energy-efficient processes (e.g. inventions using wind or solar power, processes to absorb 
or transform GHG into neutral gases, i.e. not generating heat or even if possible generating 
coldness) or products (e.g. that emit less GHG when used or are recyclable).204 In 
sum,while environmental rules act as an indirect incentive to invent greener technologies, 
in light of the urgency of tackling climate change, in accordance with the integration 
principle and notwithstanding the current patent law rationales, patent laws can and should 
do more to further reduce GHG emissions in the earth's atmosphere.  
1.3. No adversarial relationship: patent and environmental laws can work 
hand in hand  
Before tackling how further GHG emission reduction canbeachievedconcretely 
thoughthepatentlaws(Pt2), it isusefultorespondtoapossibleobjection.Somemight say that 
patent and environmental laws are fundamentally in conflict aspatent lawsupposes the 
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development of new technologies that may inevitably pollute. The answer to this objection 
can in most part be found in the discussion of the previous sections. It is worth 
summarisingthemhere aswell asaddingother reasons.  
If one admits that the integration principle has some legal effect, European and national 
legislatures don't really have a choice. They must integrate pollution control including that 
of GHG emissions in their relevant policies in addition to their environmental policy. As 
explained earlier (s.1.1.1.5.), if there is a clash between environmental and other interests, 
they must be reconciled whenever possible, as all objectives have equal footing in 
theTreaty.205 It is onlywhen it is impossible to reconcile different interests that 
exceptionally one will have to prevail over the other.206 This balance would of course 
depend on the situation although it could be argued that in the case of global warming, 
environmental interests should generally prevail as the problem is so acute. That said, is 
there really a fundamental conflict between patent and environmental laws? Arguably not 
and for several reasons.  
First of all, the “ conflict”  between intellectual property and environment, if there is any, is 
already internalised internationally in art.27.2 of TRIPs and at European level in art.53.a of 
the EPC and the relevant case law.207 Arguably, however, they do not go far enough as they 
apply only to avoid serious damage to the environment and the precautionary principle 
establishes a stricter test. Secondly, the important and current justifications for patent 
laws are not hostile towards the greening of patent.208 If the utilitarian justification 
encompasses progress in its broadest sense (i.e. not only material progress but also 
general (social and environmental/climatic) well being), both patent and environmental 
laws cohabit harmoniously. Even Locke's labour theory, which entails that there must be 
enough and as good left in the commons, can be said to be congruentwith sustainable 
development. Thirdly, environmental law's sustainable development concept by definition 
aims to conciliate economic growth and environmental protection. The two are not 
incompatible.209 Even beyond, environmental protection can be seen as an incentive to 
invent new technologies. The global cooling goal should in fact spur patenting activity; thus 
environmental protection in fact breeds economic development, as has been hinted in the 
previous section. At least in part, new technology will allow further growth. If we carry on 
using old technology or simply our resources as we do now, inevitably economic 
development will have to considerably decrease or even stop. Related to this reason, 
climate change should also foster inventions, as an invention's aim is to find solutions to 
problems and this is the core test of patent law's requirement of inventiveness.210   
This objection having been pushed aside, the second part of this article, which will be 
published in the next issue, will examine how patent laws can do more to tackle climate 
change.  
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Part I of this article (published in the previous issue) examined the general environmental 
principles as they apply to the issue of climate change, and the specific rules relating to 
global warming in order to discover what the impact of environmental laws on patent laws 
is. It revealed that according to the EC Treaty, patent laws must integrate environmental 
concerns. Part II envisages concretely how patent law can and should help further reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere over and above the current 
environmental laws. It reviews the different possible systems that can be put in place 
(negative, positive or mixed), determines which one is best (ss.1.1. to 1.3), and examines 
a method to ascertain the eco-friendliness of an invention and who should bear this burden 
of proof (s.1.4). The article concludes that patent laws urgently need to address 
environmental concerns and more particularly the problem of climate change and 
advocates the adoption of a mixed system.  
1. Implementation in patent law--how patent law can help reduce GHG 
emissions   
The question addressed by this article is how patent law can concretely do something to 
cool the planet. There are three ways in which this can be achieved. First, this can be 
achieved “ negatively” , i.e. by preventing the patenting of polluting inventions or, in other 
words, requiring that all inventions be ecofriendly. Secondly, it can be achieved 
“ positively” , i.e. by encouraging the patenting of green inventions or, in other words, 
granting them a special treatment in comparison to other inventions. Thirdly, it can be 
done through a mixed system combining the above-mentioned positive and negative 
components. This section will weigh the pros and cons of each solution and propose one of 
the systems as the most suited.  
Before examining the several possibilities, it must be noted that some provisions within 
patent laws can sometimes have the effect of protecting the environment and reducing 
GHG emissions. These are, namely, compulsory licences and the exhaustion principle. 
Compulsory licences force the inventor of an eco-friendly or more specifically 
carbon-neutral invention to make use of it if he or she refuses to do so, or to grant a licence 
to a subsequent inventor who has improved it substantially. The exhaustion principle 
allows the recycling of patented products.1 These general provisions, which help to reduce 
GHG emissions, have been explored in another contribution to which the reader is 
referred.2   
1.1. Negative system  
The idea of negative and positive systems within patent laws can be compared with similar 
systems used in environmental laws. The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is a positive 
measure (if you agree to reduce CO2, we will give you a financial incentive), while taxing 
polluting substances (e.g. the United Kingdom's climate change levy3 ) is a negative 
measure (if you do not reduce CO2, we will tax you). Accordingly, under a negative patent 
system, the law would require that to be patentable, an invention must be eco-friendly. No 
patent would be delivered for, in our specific case, inventions which increase the level of 
GHG in the atmosphere by a certain percentage. This percentage would be set in the law 
and revised if necessary. It could be based on the requirements of environmental laws (e.g. 
the Kyoto Protocol) or go further and be based on the 1990 figures of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which stated that to stabilise 
concentrations of CO2, current emissions would have to be reduced by 60 to 80 per cent.4 
Alternatively, under a softer negative system, polluting patented inventions would be 
allowed, but taxed. For instance, a fee in addition to the regular fees would be paid to a 
fund that would finance green inventions. It would thus be like a green tax and would allow 
society to recognise the utility of the patent regime.5   
European and national patent laws already have a negative system in place through the 
ordre public provision of the European Patent Convention (EPC) (art.53.a) and the case law 
interpreting it.6 It is already *I.E.L.R. 230  an important tool to cool the earth as the case 
law could be applied to excessive release of GHG by an invention, as it can potentially 
seriously damage the environment. However, the current interpretation of art.53.a does 
not go far enough, as it does not properly integrate the prevention and precautionary 
principles. In addition, only where it is likely that the patented invention will seriously 
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damage the environment will the invention be unpatentable or revoked. A closer look at the 
most relevant case, Plant Genetic Systems (PGS), 7 will abundantly demonstrate this. In 
this case, the board somewhat contradicts itself on two important points. First, the board 
did not apply the precautionary principle, although it arguably implicitly refers to it. It says 
that there may be serious damage to the environment, but finds the patent valid. Secondly, 
it says that art.53.a forces it to examine the ordre public implications of patents,8 but it 
cannot substitute for the relevant regulatory authorities. It is best to quote a number of 
passages of the decision to illustrate these two points. Concerning scientific studies that 
were presented before it, the board said:  
“ These documents provide fundamental evidence of possible hazards from the application 
of genetic engineering techniques to plants, in particular regarding the production of 
herbicide-resistant plants. This is done in order to increase the readers' awareness of the 
need to exploit this technology with caution ” 9 (emphasis added).  
Concerning the prejudice to the environment, it said: “ Of course, such events may occur 
to some extent. This fact has even been admitted by the respondents.” 10 It concludes:  
“ The Board observes that the mere fact that … there may be inadequacies in the existing 
regulatory framework does not vest the EPO with authority to carry out tasks which should 
properly be the duty of a special regulatory authority or body constituted to that effect. 
However, in the Board's view, the quoted documents do not lead to the definite conclusion 
that the exploitation of any of the claimed subject-matter would seriously prejudice the 
environment and is, therefore, contrary to „ ordre public‟ . It would be unjustified to deny 
a patent under Article 53(a) EPC [European Patent Convention] merely on the basis of 
possible, not yet conclusively-documented hazards ” 11 (emphasis added).  
This statement is clearly not applying the precautionary principle as in the board's view, a 
“ definite conclusion”  that the environment would be seriously prejudiced would need to be 
drawn in order to revoke the patent.  
One can nevertheless sympathise with the European Patent Office's (EPO's) decision on the 
second point. It is forced by art.53.a to decide whether an invention is against ordre public, 
but inmany (complex) cases, does not itself have the tools to do so. This is perhaps why it 
preferred to give the benefit of the doubt to the invention. Relevant specialised agencies 
would be better equipped to assess the dangers of an invention. Also, it has been argued 
that it may be inappropriate to leave such important matters to the EPO because it is not as 
democratic as a legislative body.12 However, it can be counter-argued that jurisdictions 
everywhere are bound to apply such provision and are not elected either. Solutions to this 
problem will be proposed below. On the first point, it may be argued that whether or not 
the EPO is bound by the precautionary principle, as the European Union and the EU Member 
States members of the EPO are bound by it and must integrate it into their law, the EPO 
may be forced to take it into account in its case law.13 If it did not, it would create 
discrepancies between the rulings of the EU Member States' national patent offices and 
courts, which are definitely bound by the principle. Unfortunately, it may well be that even 
the timid interpretation in PGS does not develop further or is even abandoned. While the 
previous EPO President was in favour of a broad interpretation of the morality and ordre 
public clause,14 this does not appear to be the view of the current one.15   
However, the majority of commentators seem to agree that art.53.a should stay and not be 
interpreted narrowly. There are arguably no legal grounds to *I.E.L.R. 231  support the 
argument that patents are not instruments of public policy and therefore should not 
enforce environmental law principles and rules in patent adjudicative proceedings.16 In any 
case, we are stuck with EPC art.53.a and similar provisions in art.6.1 of the Biotech 
Directive and TRIPs art.27.2.17 Pavoni powerfully argues that since the grant of a patent is 
“ a public reward for a contribution to scientific progress and consequently to the well-being 
of humankind” , inventions irreversibly threatening to damage the environment “ do not 
fulfil this basic requirement”  and therefore should not be patentable.18 Article 53.a thus 
forces patent offices and courts to deny patentability to or revoke patents which damage 
the environment.19 Other commentators also think that the patent system should not 
disregard ethical and moral concerns.20   
1.1.1. Pros and cons   
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Several advantages to this system can be identified. First, it is ethical. Secondly, it avoids 
a conflict where the state through its patent office accepts the patentability of an invention 
and endorses this as a public reward for the inventor's efforts and then later on rejects it, 
through its regulatory bodies. Thirdly, it also avoids a waste of the inventor's money in fees. 
Finally, perhaps the strongest argument, which is linked to the first one, is that art.53.a is 
here to stay (it is unlikely to be deleted or revised from the EPC and/or national laws) and 
its very purpose is to discourage researchers from investing money in unethical inventions, 
as they run the risk of not getting rewarded.  
The main argument against this system is that patent laws should not be making ethical 
considerations, and that this should be left to other laws. In such a system, the inventor 
would still be able to obtain a patent and if the regulatory body refuses to give its 
exploitation authorisation, it may be possible to revisit its decision once more evidence is 
adduced or public policy or environmental standards have changed years later, with the 
patent finally being able to be exploited. In reply to this argument, it could be envisaged 
that inventors could still send (not properly file a patent application) documents recording 
their inventions to the patent office, which would keep them until environmental evidence 
is more concrete and which would constitute proof of first to file. Once the evidence is 
positive, the patentee could then file its application. However, in some cases, this can take 
years and the technology may have become obsolete anyway.  
Another powerful argument at first sight is that if polluting inventions are prohibited, they 
fall in the public domain so that everyone can exploit them, they become more spread out 
and as they cost less than the patented green ones, people use them more.21 However, this 
argument does not hold true for two main reasons. First, if they are prohibited, those who 
wish to have exclusivity will not waste their money in investing in dirty or polluting 
inventions.22 They will instead try to invent green ones to be rewarded with the exclusivity 
of a patent. Secondly, environmental laws also prohibit pollution, so that even if some 
businesses may want to carry on using polluting products and processes, the law will fire 
back from another corner to punish them. This shows again that environmental and patent 
laws are complementary.  
Accordingly, it seems that we cannot do without a negative system (at least currently and 
realistically). Solutions for the negative system based on EPC art.53.a to apply can be 
elaborated so that the system works better than it currently does. First, on substance, 
changes in the national laws and ideally the EPC would be better for legal certainty. The 
easiest way would be to include damage to the environment within art.53.a so that 
environmentally damaging inventions are not patentable. This would include all and not 
only serious environmental damage. For clarity, the provision would also include excessive 
release of GHG within environmental damage. Secondly, on procedure, although it is clear 
that the EPO must check whether an invention does not offend public policy, what is less 
clear is how it should do this. It is a recurrent objection that the EPO should not perform 
this task because it:  
“ … would interfere with other the relevant [sic] authorities applying the principle to the 
grant of authorisations, either to upstream research activities or the downstream 
marketing of products” 23   
It has also been argued that patent offices are illequipped to make this assessment. 
However, this is not an insolvable problem. Solutions can be envisaged. The easiest one is 
that the EPO or national patent offices should suspend their proceedings on the 
patentability of a potentially polluting invention until the relevant body or agency has ruled 
on this issue, and then follow their decision. Alternatively, if the EPO or national offices 
need help on this issue, they should ask a question to the relevant regulatory body, and 
suspend proceedings until the latter answers and then decide on the basis of the regulatory 
body's opinion. Similar systems could be used in infringement actions. The defendant could 
counterclaim, say the patent is contrary to ordre public and ask the court to refer a 
question to the regulatory body. Accordingly, art.53.a should also include a sentence 
referring to how it is to assess environmental damage.  
Currently, however, the law is unsatisfactory. Patent law caters for environmental 
protection very inadequately, let alone for the reduction of GHG emissions in the 
atmosphere. Article 53.a's case law *I.E.L.R. 232  does not go far enough and the 
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integration principle is not (yet) implemented into European and national laws and 
decisions. The integration principle's current force is a hindrance to its better application. 
There may be a glimpse of hope, however, in the PGS decision itself. The board stated that:  
“ … it would undoubtedly be against „ ordre public‟  or morality to propose a misuse or a 
destructive use of these techniques. Thus, under article 53.a EPC, no patent may be 
granted in respect of an invention directed to such a use.” 24   
Therefore, if an opponent's argument that the invention seriously damages the 
environment fails to convince the EPO, national patent office or court, he or she could say 
that the proposed technology is misused or contributes to the destruction of the 
environment, e.g. by increasing GHG in the atmosphere above a certain percentage. It 
remains to be seen, however, how these two sentences will be further interpreted by the 
EPO, national offices and courts.  
1.2. Positive system  
Under a positive system, green inventions would be encouraged through a special, 
preferential treatment within the patent laws. This system would not ban inventions which 
are not eco-friendly, but simply encourage those which are. A number of measures can be 
envisaged to treat green inventions more favourably or in other words subsidise them:  
• give green inventions priority over others by giving applicants administrative 
advantages%Y(3)6D faster examination, reduced fees for the application, grant and 
maintenance of patents, removal of green inventions from deferred examination, earlier 
publication and/or priority at the opposition and infringement stages25 (so-called “ fast 
track”  system26 );  
• stronger protection,27 e.g. lengthen the term of green inventions (one example would be 
to give a Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) at the end of the normal patent term 
if it is proven that the patent had significant environmental benefits)28 ;  
• compulsory licences,29 voluntary buy-outs of patents and purchasing commitments30 ;  
• research funded by the state to protect the environment31 (this is already partially done 
by national and EU funding, e.g. through university research centres funded by granting 
bodies and by the FP7 source of funding);  
• “ providing official assistance in exploiting inventions” 32 ; and  
• prizes or lump sums, which would be paid to the inventor in proportion with the 
invention's usefulness.33   
Within a positive system, should there be specific sector priorities? First, a priority could be 
made between different types of pollution. As global warming is probably the most pressing 
environmental problem, those inventions which tackle it should be examined in priority.34 
Then, within this specific sector, as the fastest growing source of GHG emissions is 
transport,35 there could be a further priority in this area of patenting, for instance for better 
fuel-efficient cars, fuels that emit less or no CO2, etc.  
1.2.1. Pros and cons   
The advantages of this system are evident (reduction of pollution including GHG emissions 
should ensue). However, such special regime “ cuts two ways” .36 It provides a stronger 
incentive, but on the other hand, it makes the technology more expensive to use.37 It may 
also take longer for patents to be granted.38 In addition, if this special treatment is given to 
green inventions, then patentees in other fields will claim they should also be treated 
favourably (e.g. pharmaceutical products).39 Furthermore, an entirely positive system 
would mean that art.53.a and similar national provisions would have to be repealed, which 
is unlikely and, in our view, unhealthy. Some have also argued that sometimes an 
invention not connected to the environment could become one later. Therefore, green 
inventions should not benefit from favoured treatment. This is not irremediable. If this is so, 
the patentee could be rewarded a posteriori by a longer term, for instance, or a 
reimbursement of its patent *I.E.L.R. 233  fees or more. Finally, a preferential treatment 
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may favour a race to make green inventions, which is good, but, of course, can have side 
effects because inventors will try to fit in the criteria. This is why we need strict standards 
so there is no “ rentseeking” . The strongest argument against the specific feature of a 
positive system which would prolong the term of the patent is its contradiction with the EPC. 
However, EPC art.63.2.b could be used to justify such prolongation as in every case an 
authorisation would have to be granted. On the other hand, TRIPs does not prevent a 
longer term (art.33)40 and specifically allows more protection if it does not contradict the 
TRIPs agreement (art.1). Otherwise, it seems that the European Union could “ circumvent”  
EPC art.63 as it arguably did for the SPCs.  
Finally, a mixed system would simply combine the elements of each, i.e. those of a positive 
and a negative system. Thus, inventors would be unable to patent polluting inventions or 
else would be taxed and greener inventions would benefit from a preferential treatment in 
comparison with the other types of inventions.  
1.3. Which system is best?  
Looking back at all of the pros and cons, which system would be best? And how would a 
negative, positive or combined system fare under the several current and proposed new 
justifications for patent law?  
There are more pros than cons, or the cons carry less weight than it seems. The 
advantages speak for themselves. The con of the negative system has already been 
addressed in Part I, section 2.1. As to the cons of a positive system, it may be true that it 
may take longer to grant patents, but in any case, the inventor has to have its invention 
first assessed by the relevant environmental agency. Only when it gets the green light 
would the patent be “ properly”  filed so that the term would not be affected. In many cases, 
for all sorts of inventions implying a danger (medicines, some food, some other 
technologies involving safety), patentees have to wait to be able to exploit their invention. 
Therefore, this problem is not new (and has been resolved for some products with SPCs). 
The same goes for cost. For the same reason, it would not cost more than at present as the 
assessment would be done by the same regulatory body, and endorsed by the relevant 
patent office. The objection that inventions in other sectors, such as the pharmaceutical 
sector, are also worthy of preferential treatment can easily be resolved by adopting a 
special treatment for them as well. As a matter of fact, they already enjoy such treatment 
thanks to the SPCs.  
Apart from the justice and fairness rationale, the current patent rationales do not seem in 
obvious contradiction with a positive and/or negative system. Some favour one or the 
other system more strongly than others. The labour theory's enough and as good 
requirement seems to be in accordance with a negative and perhaps also a positive system. 
The fairness or justice rationale would probably dictate that all inventions deserve to be 
patented, even if they damage the environment. Therefore, neither a positive nor a 
negative system would be possible, although a favoured treatment of green inventions 
could be argued. Anegative system could be envisaged under the slightly more detailed 
reward theory (it seems contradictory to reward damaging inventions), and a positive 
system could be argued too as green inventions arguably deserve a greater reward. The 
utilitarian rationale, which still underlies most patent laws today, already agrees with a 
negative system (as illustrated by EPC art.53.a and corresponding national provisions).41 A 
positive system, however, is not obvious because of the principle of neutrality, although 
the justification does not per se prevent such system.42 The disclosure function (under 
which, as a reminder, patents exist to provide information to the rest of the industry) would 
agree with a negative and also a positive system. A negative system would prevent the 
disclosure of damaging technology43 and a positive system would encourage even more 
disclosure. Finally, the public sanction function of the patent system is definitely in favour 
of a negative system and possibly also of a positive one.  
What about the proposed revisited or new justifications? If the utilitarian function of patent 
law is revised following the developments made in the previously published article,44 a 
negative system is mandatory. Accordingly, under this extended view of progress (i.e. the 
idea that the “ progress”  rationale includes not only material wealth, but general wealth 
and therefore also a good environment), all inventions and creations must be 
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environmentally friendly and there need not be a special regime for environmentally 
friendly inventions and creations. Only a negative regime could therefore be envisaged. Of 
course, the view which proposes simply to take environmental concerns into account in 
patent laws accommodates both systems separately or combined.  
What can be learned from this analysis? Apart from one justification (which is not currently 
popular), all other traditional justifications seem to accommodate both a positive and 
negative system, although some (the disclosure and public sanction functions) do seem to 
agree with them more than others. Of course, the view which simply proposes to 
incorporate environmental issues is agreeable to both systems. The revised incentive 
theory may be going too much towards the other extreme. Therefore, at least, from the 
point of view of the environment, we could and should probably reform patent law under 
the disclosure and public sanction function. Of course, a more fundamental reform could be 
thought through which would incorporate the environmental concern as a function of 
patent law. In our view, a mixed positive and negative system seems the best system at 
*I.E.L.R. 234  least to tackle serious environmental problems such as climate change. A 
negative system is already good, as long as it is applied effectively and therefore taking 
into consideration the points made in Part I, section 2.1.Apositive system without a 
negative one would be somewhat effective, but would send the wrong signal. In any case, 
it is not possible to envisage unless the EPC and national patents laws are revised to delete 
the ordre public provision. Purely negative systems could remain for less serious problems 
than global warming.  
1.4. Ways to determine and prove an invention's eco-friendliness  
In order for the positive and/or negative systems to work, standards need to be established 
to know what an environmentally friendly invention is. How are we to set these standards? 
Concretely, how much less GHG should a patented product emit so that it is classified as a 
climate friendly invention and can benefit from the advantages of the specific regime? Who 
is going to decide upon these standards and whether or not they are in each particular case 
fulfilled? A related issue tackled by this section is who should bear the burden of proof that 
the patented product or process respects these environmental standards.  
1.4.1. Standards setting   
Before tackling the standards issue, one important point must be noted. In the field of 
climate change, it is the prevention principle that applies, not the precautionary principle, 
if one makes a difference between the two. The distinction is important. As noted in Part I, 
section 1.1.1.2, the prevention principle applies when it is more or less certain that an 
event will occur. The IPCC report in November 2007 stated that it was beyond reasonable 
doubt that humans contributed to global warming by emitting GHG. Therefore, the 
assessment of the risks to human, animal or plant health need not be made as it is already 
clear. Thus, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) or other methods need not be used.45 Moreover, if 
an assessment was made according to the PGS ruling, the threat to the environment of an 
invention emitting above a certain threshold of GHG would probably never be sufficiently 
substantiated. This is because it is the cumulative effect of all inventions doing so that 
substantiates the threat. This is another reason why this method is not appropriate in the 
case of the specific environmental problem of global warming. If one was not yet convinced, 
one could inspire oneself of the obligation that intellectual property laws do not run counter 
to environmental security (art.16.5 of the Convention on Biodiversity), which:  
“ necessarily requires judicial bodies and legislatures to give precedence to biosafety 
concerns over trade values which are fostered by patents on potentially devastating 
inventions.” 46   
However, CBA and other assessment methods may be appropriate for other environmental 
problems where the precautionary principle applies rather than the prevention principle. 
Such discussion is left to future research.  
There are several ways to set the standards. The most straightforward way that comes to 
mind is simply to follow those already set in the environmental laws. For climate change 
issues, several targets have been set in the Directives and Regulations, which could be 
      Page28  
 
followed. More generally, it could be said that in order to be patented, every process or 
product that emits GHG should emit 8 per cent less of them compared to the same 
product's emissions in 1990 (the target the European Union agreed to respect in the 
context of the ratification of Kyoto Protocol, see Pt I, s.1.1.2.2). The relevant regulatory 
body (e.g. European Environmental Agency)47 could check whether the product or process 
fulfils this requirement.48 This would not prevent the applicant from filing his or her patent. 
Examination would just be suspended until the relevant body issues its opinion. There 
could even be a possibility to amend the patent if the relevant body issues a negative 
statement. Whether 8 per cent should be the relevant or general standard is debatable. In 
some fields, it may be more difficult to invent products or processes which release less GHG. 
Therefore, in those fields, a lesser percentage could be the standard. In other fields, where 
it is easier, a higher percentage could be set.  
Another issue is whether this standard should be written down in the patent laws, and be 
revised every *I.E.L.R. 235  so often. It has already been argued that art.53.a should be 
revised to include that an invention cannot be patented if it may prejudice the environment. 
In the same vein, in a combined negative and positive system, patent laws should provide 
that a patent cannot be granted if the invention does not meet the standard of 8 (or x as 
revised) per cent less GHG compared to 1990 levels and that advantages (as listed in s.1.2 
above) should be granted if the invention exceeds the standard or, even better, is GHG or 
carbon neutral. The more eco-friendly the invention is, the more numerous such 
advantages could be or several advantages could be combined. The sky is the limit in terms 
of flexibility the law can afford to various degrees of eco-friendliness. In this view, patent 
laws would encourage going beyond environmental law's targets. Patent laws could further 
provide that the prospective patentee must first contact the relevant agency to check if his 
or her invention complies with the standard.  
For certain inventions, additional checks should be made. For instance, building on the 
Directive on the promotion of biofuels, before the patent is granted, assessment of 
sustainability of the invention (the specific biofuel in question) should be carried out. As it 
is well known, biofuels may reduce CO2 emissions when used to drive vehicles, but may ex 
ante deplete food resources and raise CO2 levels if forests need to be cut down to allow 
more agriculture of the raw materials that are used to make them. As has been said at the 
beginning of this article, only the issue of climate change is addressed here, but protection 
of the environment more generally is in question. The same question should therefore be 
thought through for every issue within environmental protection, and therefore sustainable 
development.  
This example highlights a related issue that the law could also envisage. So far the legal 
change would require that the proposed product or process, during its lifespan, does not 
emit more than x per cent GHG (ex post ). However, the law could further require that the 
manufacturing of the product (ex ante ) does not either. This is an additional question 
which should be posed. Perhaps the IPCC and ETS Directives already deal with this issue as 
products will generally be made out of heavy components.  
There is, however, a problem with the proposed system above. Both TRIPs art.27.2 and 
EPC art.53.a provide that countries may not prevent the patentability of an invention 
simply because the exploitation of the invention is prohibited by their law.49 The way 
around this is to say that the prohibition is one that is based solely on ordre public and not 
merely based on environmental law--but this will not do, it seems. This means that a 
patent should still be granted even if its commercialisation depends on an authorisation (to 
meet certain requirements).50 In other words, patent offices:  
“ … should not leave patents pending on a decision concerning the invention's meeting of 
extra-patent law requirements (such as security and quality). Patents should be granted or 
rejected on grounds of patentability only.” 51   
Indeed, the law on security or quality may later be modified or repealed, therefore allowing 
the exploitation (commercial or not) of the patented invention.52 In our current system, 
this has a perverse effect. This means that all patent applications being treated equally, 
(potentially or even clearly) damaging inventions will be treated in the same way as those 
deserving ones (e.g. eco-friendly). This can be seen as a waste of public time, money and 
resources (i.e. that of the patent offices) if the patent cannot in the end be exploited 
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anyway.53   
However, in amixed positive and negative system, this problem can be resolved. Indeed, 
nothing in the EPC or TRIPs prevents special treatment for some inventions. The European 
SPCs are a proof of this. Thus, even if suspending the patent application until the 
regulatory body has given its opinion may breach international law, making those patent 
applications wait at the bottom of the pile does not.  
1.4.2. Burden of proof   
Who should bear the burden of proof that the patented product or process meets the 
standard? If we are to follow the environmental principles of rectification at source and 
polluter pays which should be integrated in EU policies, it should be the inventor. As a 
reminder, *I.E.L.R. 236  the polluter-pays principle means that the price of environmental 
damage should not be borne by society (through taxation), but by the polluter. The 
principle of the rectification of environmental damage at source favours the control of 
pollution at the point of emission rather than further down the chain. However, the problem 
is the identification of the polluter and the source of the pollution. If the invention is a new 
engine for a car, is the polluter the oil producer, the inventor or the driver? We could take 
as a principle that it is the inventor of the car. The oil may already be taxed anyway. This 
would mean that the inventor, not the regularity authority, will have to convince the 
regulatory authority that his or her invention meets the standard set. This also means that 
in opposition proceedings before national patent offices or the EPO, it should not be the 
opponent, but the patentee who should bear the burden of proof. Currently, this is not the 
case.54 This was illustrated in the PGS case, where the burden of proof that the exploitation 
of the invention would seriously prejudice the environment laid with Greenpeace, not 
PGS.55 In its Communication on the Precautionary Principle, the Commission also favours 
the reversal of the burden of proof.56 Indeed:  
“ … in this context it matters critically on whom the burden of proof lies. It is one thing to 
require a patentee to establish that the invention is environmentally safe (by some 
accepted criterion). It is a very different thing to require an opponent to a patent to 
establish that the invention is not safe.” 57   
This rule will not discourage the invention of green technology in a mixed negative and 
positive system, or even in a purely negative system. All inventors will have to comply with 
the rule that inventions must meet the Kyoto or even the stricter EU targets. If they do not, 
they will not be patentable. If they go beyond, perhaps the burden of proof should be 
shifted back to the regulatory authority. Therefore, as long as the applicant proves that his 
or her invention meets the standard, if he or she claims that it is even more GHG friendly, 
it would be for the regulatory authority to disprove it. This would maintain a good balance 
and provide further incentives to “ invent carbon neutral”  and, generally, “ invent green” .  
1.5. Conclusion  
The best system is a combination of both negative and positive aspects, as in 
environmental law.58 The current EPC and national patent laws would need to be revised as 
stated above to incorporate the changes. Therefore, art.53.a and corresponding national 
provisions should specifically write down the risk of prejudice to the environment as against 
ordre public, that the prevention or precautionary principle should be taken into account 
depending on the risk of the technology for the environment. These provisions or others 
that should be added should also state that “ greener inventions”  (those meeting 
standards set by the relevant agencies or bodies) receive preferential treatment. The 
choice of special regime (fast track, longer term, etc.) is really up to the legislatures. This 
treatment can be modulated in function of the degree of eco-friendliness of the invention. 
Inventions which cut down GHG release should certainly receive the most advantageous 
regime. The burden of proof should be on the inventor, but if he or she claims that his or 
her invention goes above the target set in the law, the burden would shift back on the 
regulatory body to prove it does not. This way, incentives should be kept balanced. 
Therefore, while it would not be possible to suspend patentability until the relevant 
authority hands down its verdict or refuse the patent if the verdict is negative (i.e. the 
invention is not environmentally friendly), non-abiding inventions would be relegated to 
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the end of the pile as those green ones would proceed on the fast-track. While the best way 
to achieve this would obviously be amending the EPC and national laws, it may take 
considerable time. An alternative solution would be for environmental organisations such 
as Greenpeace and the like to push the interpretation of art.53.a in the direction advocated 
in this article, as in the PGS case. However, a commitment from the legislature would be 
needed to grant a favourable regime to greener inventions. It seems, from what was 
uttered by the European Commission and EPO officials at the 2008 European Patent Forum 
and by the EPO's vice-president, Manuel De Santes, at the 2008 ATRIP Annual Congress, 
that this may not be impossible.  
Conclusion   
The answer to the question posed by this article is definitely affirmative. Patents can help 
cool the planet --and they should. European Union environmental law quasi-obliges them 
too. Solutions have been proposed above and will not be repeated here. What should be 
said in conclusion is still more pragmatic. Europe, as one of the richest and most polluting 
regions in the world, where the Industrial Revolution and its unfortunate bad effects 
started, should lead the way to find solutions to global warming. As we did before when we 
invented all of these new machines in the 18th and 19th centuries, we should again be first 
not only in inventing, but in inventing green, and thereby set an example to the rest of the 
world. It is not (only if at all) a question a pride though. It is a question of survival. The 
issue is intrinsically international as we are all dependent on the well-being of our 
ecosystems, and first of all the world's temperature and climates. Of course, the greening 
of patent law is not a panacea, but it gives incentives (if not pressures) to invent 
mechanisms to cool the earth. Politically, it also sends the right signal. It will be seen that 
the patent system is not only a “ monopoly-granting machine”  and that “ capitalists”  can 
also be green. This rhetoric is not the prerogative of environmental organisations. The 
public will perhaps reconcile itself with intellectual property or at least patents, which have 
unfortunately *I.E.L.R. 237  decreased in popularity these last few years because of the 
excesses of right holders, to which the legislature bowed almost blindly.59 Such changes 
will also promote green awareness, behaviour and responsibility. It will be good if the 
European Union sets the trend, but, of course, it will only be one step, as the issue--to be 
effective--must be tackled globally. This article has focused largely on European law. 
However, the arguments developed and models advocated can also apply at international 
level. Accordingly, TRIPs art.27.2 should be revised in the same way as advocated in this 
article. A declaration could be drafted and signed by prominent academics to convince 
political bodies to move in this direction.  
Of course, environmental law must continue regulating activities as not all polluting 
products and methods are patented. Environmental and patent laws are complementary. 
There are also already many existing climate-friendly machines and processes not 
protected by patents.60 These can already be put into practice. Conversely, there are 
patents which can be used free of charge thanks to the goodwill of their owners. The 
eco-patents commons private initiative can be noted.61 Beyond law, other tools and 
initiatives can also regulate or prevent environmental damage, including economic 
instruments (e.g. voluntary ETS), self-regulation (e.g. product labelling)62 and voluntary 
agreements (see, for instance, the agreements of car manufacturers with the 
Commission).63 Of course, prizes, awards, research grants, etc. granted by the state or 
private sponsors can be used in addition to patents,64 and there are numerous such 
initiatives out there already.65   
Therefore, even if the mixed positive and negative system proposed is not put into place, 
which would be a shame, other instruments are already doing their bit to help us survive on 
this unique and wonderful planet. In the end, global cooling will be the result of joint efforts. 
Not only should we change the law, but also our habits and ideology.66 Furthermore, 
growth, and capitalistic profits that go with it, should normally not have to be stopped to 
cool the earth67 ; they can go on, but be greened. That should make us (and other living 
beings, plants and the earth) live better and happier than ever before. Long live progress…  
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